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Resumo 
 
 
Manter um nível adequado de liquidez dentro da organização é fundamental para o bom 
funcionamento das empresas. Os gestores têm a tendência de manter grande parte dos activos da 
empresa sob a forma de disponibilidades e equivalente em dinheiro para investir em outros 
activos físicos, fazer pagamentos aos accionistas e manter o dinheiro dentro da empresa. O nível 
de disponibilidades que uma empresa mantém é influenciado pelas suas políticas de estrutura de 
capital, as necessidades de fundo de maneio, gestão de fluxo de caixa, pagamentos de 
dividendos, investimentos e gestão de activos. Este estudo centra-se em analisar os factores que 
determinam o nível de tesouraria das pequenas e médias empresas industriais portuguesas, para 
o período 2001-2007. Os resultados deste estudo estão em conformidade com as pesquisas 
anteriores e mostram que o tamanho da empresa, as suas oportunidades de crescimento, o 
relacionamento com as instituições financeiras, a incerteza dos fluxos de caixa, a estrutura de 
endividamento, a liquidez e a alavancagem afectam significativamente a tesouraria das PMEs 
não financeiras de Portugal. 
 
Palavras-chave: Tesouraria, PMEs, o modelo de Trade-off, Pecking Order, Modelo Free 
Cash Flow 
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Abstract 
 
 
 
Maintaining an appropriate level of liquidity within the organization is fundamental 
towards the smooth operations of firms. Managers have a tendency to hold large proportion of 
firm assets in the form of cash and cash equivalents in order to reinvest on other physical assets, 
payments to stockholders and to keep cash inside the firm. The level of cash a firm maintains is 
influenced by its policies regarding capital structure, working capital requirements, cash flow 
management, dividend payments, investments and asset management. This study focuses on 
analyzing the factors that determine the level of corporate cash holdings of non-financial 
Portuguese manufacturing small and medium-sized firms, for the period 2001 to 2007. The 
findings of this study are in conformity with the earlier research and reflect that firm size, 
growth opportunity, relationship with banks, cash flow uncertainty, debt structure, liquidity and 
leverage significantly affect the cash holdings of non-financial SMEs in Portugal. 
 
Keywords: Cash Holdings, SMEs, Trade-off Model, Pecking Order, Free Cash Flow Model 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
Why do firms hold large amounts of cash and cash equivalents? Various explanations 
have been offered for the incentives of firms to hold cash and various empirical studies tested 
the determinant factors of firms’ cash levels. 
 It is argued that the main benefit of holding cash in an imperfect capital market is the 
increase in firms’ ability to avoid excessive costs of external financing. However, it is also 
recognized that there are costs associated with holding cash. The most obvious of these costs is 
that managers and controlling shareholders can retain cash to pursue their own private 
objectives, which need not coincide with those of outside investors (Jensen, 1986). The 
investors do, however, have various internal control mechanisms available to reduce the conflict 
of interest, such as share blocks, the board of directors, compensation systems and the presence 
of institutional investors. In this context, in firms where ownership and control are firmly 
separated, as is the case of firms listed on organized markets, managers can use the funds on 
projects that do not clearly benefit the shareholders, or alternatively they may pursue personal 
objectives. But in small and medium-sized firms the ownership and management generally 
coincide, meaning that conflicts between managers and shareholders are rare or non-existent. 
Instead, the coincidence between ownership and control means that agency problems associated 
with debt are more significant (Berger and Udell, 2003). 
Investment in liquid assets has an opportunity cost for the firm due to their low return, 
particularly if the firm forgoes more profitable investment to hold that level of cash.  However, 
liquid assets have traditionally been justified for transaction motives, to meet the needs that 
come from the firm’s normal activities, as well as for precautionary motives, to help to meet 
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unforeseen requirements for cash (Miller and Orr, 1966). Consequently, one would expect firms 
that are likely to incur higher transaction costs to hold greater amounts of liquid assets. On the 
other hand, the precautionary motive places more emphasis on the costs arising from the 
foregone investment opportunities. According to this approach, firms accumulate cash to meet 
their unanticipated contingencies that may arise and to finance their investments if the costs of 
their other sources of funding are prohibitively high.  
If market imperfections did not exist, firms’ financial decisions would not affect their 
value. In this situation, keeping liquid financial assets would be irrelevant. Indeed, the volume 
of cash kept for dealing with productive investments or temporary cash shortfalls could be 
obtained without problem and at a reasonable price. On the other hand, the absence of a 
premium for liquidity or taxes would mean that keeping cash would not have an opportunity 
cost or fiscal disadvantages, respectively. Thus, in these circumstances, decisions about 
investment in liquid assets would not affect shareholder wealth. 
However, the presence of market imperfections implies that there is an optimal cash 
level that balances costs and benefits and maximizes the value of the firm. In addition, we 
should also bear in mind the firm’s capacity to generate cash and its possibilities of obtaining 
funds, since these elements will also affect cash level decisions. 
In relation to the benefits of keeping cash, in the first place the existence of information 
asymmetry makes it more expensive for firms to obtain external funding due to problems 
associated with adverse selection. From this perspective, Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that in 
the presence of information asymmetry firms establish a hierarchy in their use of financing 
sources. They will prefer to finance themselves with resources generated internally before 
resorting to the market. Agency conflicts between shareholders and creditors also make it more 
difficult and more expensive to obtain funds. All this can lead to distortions in the firms’ 
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investments that generate underinvestment problems. In this situation, keeping liquid assets can 
reduce the costs of being dependent on external financing. Moreover, possessing certain cash 
levels reduces the likelihood of financial distress, especially for those firms with more volatile 
cash flows. On the base of these benefits and costs, the theoretical finance literature offers three 
alternative models to explain why firms hold cash: the Trade-off Model, Pecking Order Theory 
and Free Cash Flow Theory. 
Most of the previous studies focused their analysis on large publicly traded companies, 
less attention being given to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and to the 
determinants of their level of cash holdings.  
The goal of this paper is to contribute to the literature of corporate finance by providing 
empirical evidence on the determinants of cash holdings in small and medium-sized Portuguese 
firms. 
While previous studies analysed the market imperfections that determine the decisions of 
cash holdings in large publicly traded companies, such as information asymmetry, agency 
conflicts or financial distress, the results obtained may not be applicable to the sector of small 
and medium-sized enterprises, due to the fact that the imperfections mentioned above are more 
serious in the case of SMEs. Actually, the main characteristic of SMEs, which distinguishes 
them from the larger firms, is their greater informational opacity, which worsens information 
asymmetry problems. On the other hand, the coincidence of ownership and control and the 
greater flexibility in operations in this type of firm makes the agency problems more serious. 
Moreover, the SMEs are more likely to suffer financial difficulties and their transaction costs 
are relatively higher, given the economies of scale associated with these costs. 
In Portugal, in 2007 the SMEs represented 99,6% of the total organizations, providing 
more than 75% of total national employment and generating more than 56% of national 
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turnover1. Therefore, the small and medium-sized enterprises are the backbone of the economic 
life in Portugal and a major factor to the country’s economic development.  
Existing literature has mainly focused on evaluating the cash balances of large firms 
across different industries in order to establish a relationship between asset management 
practices and firm performance. The literature does not provide considerable research on 
determinants of corporate cash holdings for small and medium-sized firms. 
This study extends and improves the currently available empirical literature in two ways. 
First, we analyse the determinants of cash holdings of SMEs, a sector little investigated by 
previous researches, but one of great importance in today’s global economy. Second, it presents 
evidence for a sample of Portuguese SMEs, a country where an empirical study in the field of 
cash holdings determinants for small and medium-sized firms was not yet realized. 
The results obtained shows that on average the Portuguese SMEs hold 4,77% of their 
total assets in cash and their decisions of cash holding are highly influenced by the information 
asymmetry and agency conflicts existing in this type of firms. Therefore, the SMEs with better 
relationship with the financial institutions and shorter debt structure have a lower level of cash 
holdings (a decrease of one standard deviation in the variable BANKR produces an increase in 
cash holdings by 1,3%). Moreover, the firms with greater probability of financial distress and 
those with high level of cash flows tend to hold more cash (an increase of one standard 
deviation in the variable FDISTRESS produces an increase in the cash held by firms by 13,1%). 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the theory and the empirical 
evidence, examining the main determinants of investment in liquid assets. In Section 3 are 
discussed the sample, the variables and the methodology used. In Section 4 are presented the 
results of the research. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper. 
                                                 
1
 Data from the Portuguese National Statistic Institute (INE) for 2007. 
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2. Why do firms hold cash? 
 
2.1. Theories of cash holdings 
 
Cash and cash equivalents are considered as some of the most important component of 
current assets and are the lifeline of corporate financial management. The managers hold a 
substantial portion of company assets in the form of cash and liquid securities for reinvestment 
in physical assets, distribution to investors and to keep cash inside the firm (Almeida et al, 
2002). The corporate cash holdings patterns are usually explained in the framework of three 
theories, namely: the Trade-off Model, Pecking Order Theory and Free Cash Flow Theory. 
According to the Trade-off Model, firms set their optimal level of cash holdings by 
weighting the marginal costs and marginal benefits of holding cash. Assuming that managers 
maximize the shareholders’ wealth, they will set the firm’s cash holdings in a way that the 
marginal benefit equals the marginal cost of holding cash. The optimal amount of liquid assets is 
given by the intersection of the marginal cost of liquid assets curve and the marginal cost of 
liquid asset shortage curve (Figure 1). 
There are several benefits related with holding cash. First, cash holdings reduce the 
likelihood of financial distress as it acts as a safety reserve to face unexpected losses or external 
fund raising constraints. Second, cash holdings allow the pursuance of the optimal investment 
policy even when financial constraints are met. Otherwise, external fund raising constraints 
would force the firm to forgo investment projects with positive net present value (NPV). Finally, 
cash holdings contribute to minimize the cost of raising external funds or liquidating existing 
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assets as it acts like a buffer between the firm sources and uses of funds (Ferreira and Vilela, 
2004).  
The traditional marginal cost of holding cash is the opportunity cost of the capital due to 
the low return on liquid assets. In addition, agency problems between managers and 
shareholders may be exacerbated when cash levels are high. Furthermore, for some categories of 
shareholders, it may be more efficient from a tax point of view if firms were to distribute cash 
rather than to invest in liquid assets (Kim et al., 1998). 
According to this theory, the main SMEs characteristics that are relevant to their cash 
holdings decisions are: 
a) Leverage – it is generally accepted that leverage increases the probability of 
bankruptcy due to the pressure that rigid amortization plans put on the firms treasury 
management. To reduce the probability of experiencing financial distress, firms with 
higher leverage are expected to hold more cash. On the other hand, the empirical 
evidence (Kim et al., 1998, Opler et al. 1999, Ferreira and Vilela, 2004, and Ozkan 
and Ozkan, 2004) demonstrates a reduction in cash levels when firms increase their 
financial leverage. This may be because the costs of the funds used to invest in liquid 
assets rise as financial leverage rise. Thus, the predicted relationship between cash 
holdings and leverage is ambiguous. 
b)  Size – the traditional models to determine the optimal cash levels (Miller and Orr, 
1966) demonstrate that there are economies of scale associated with the cash levels 
required to confront the normal transactions of the firm, so that larger firms can keep 
lower cash holdings. Also, it is argued that the fees incurred in obtaining funds 
through borrowing are uncorrelated with the size of the loan, indicating that such 
fees are a fixed amount (Peterson and Rajan, 2003). Thus, raising funds is relatively 
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more expensive to smaller firms encouraging them to hold more cash than larger 
firms. Therefore, it is expecting a negative relation between firm size and cash 
holdings. 
c) Cash flow – as cash flow represents an additional source of liquidity for the firm, it 
can be seen as a cash substitute (Kim et al., 1998). Thus, a negative relation between 
cash flow and cash holdings is expected. 
d) Debt maturity structure – as Guney et al. (2003) and Ferreira and Vilela (2004) 
demonstrate, the distribution of debt maturities between short and long term can also 
affect decisions concerning cash holdings. Firms that rely on short-term debt must 
renegotiate periodically their credit terms, and are subject to the risk of experiencing 
financial distress if constraints are met to the renewal of credit lines. Thus, one will 
expect debt maturity to be negatively related to cash holdings. 
e)  Liquidity – the presence of liquid assets apart from cash and marketable securities 
(for example, debtors and inventories) can also affect a firm’s optimal cash holdings, 
since they can be considered substitutes for cash. It is therefore expected for firms 
with more non-cash liquid assets to reduce their cash levels. 
f) Relationships with Financial Institutions – establishing banking relationships 
between borrower and lender reduces information asymmetry and agency problems, 
since valuable information about client quality can be disclosed. Therefore, building 
relationships with financial institutions will improve a firms’ ability to access 
external financing, this suggesting that firms with a higher proportion of bank debt 
will be able to access external financing more easily, thus holding less cash (Ozkan 
and Ozkan, 2004). In the case of SMEs, maintaining bank relationships helps them 
improve the availability of funds, since they suffer less credit rationing in the bank 
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credit market (Petersen and Rajan, 1994, Harhoff and Korting, 1998, Bodt et al. 
2001).  
g) Financial Distress – the cost of financial distress arise when the firm cannot meet its 
payment obligations contracted with third parties, either in the short or the long term. 
Guney et al. (2003), Ferreira and Vilela (2004) and Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) argue 
that firms in financial distress could raise their cash levels in order to reduce their 
default risk. On the other hand, Kim et al. (1998) expects firms with greater 
likelihood of financial distress to have lower levels of liquidity, as they cannot 
accumulate cash, since they will use any liquid resources available to pay what they 
owe. 
The Pecking Order Theory emerges as a result of asymmetric information existing in 
the financial markets, that is, corporate managers often have better information about the health 
of their companies than outside investors. According to this theory (Myers 1984), firms finance 
investments firstly with retained earnings, then with safe debt and risky debt, and finally with 
equity (Figure 2). When current operational cash flows are sufficient enough to finance new 
investments, firms repay debt and accumulate cash. When retained earnings are not enough to 
finance current investments, firms use the accumulated cash holdings and, if needed, issue debt. 
The purpose of this order of financing is to minimize asymmetric information costs and other 
financing costs. 
This theory suggests that firms do not have target cash levels, but instead, cash is used as 
a buffer between retained earnings and investment needs. When current operational cash flows 
are sufficient enough to finance new investments, firms repay debt and accumulate cash. When 
retained earnings are not enough to finance current investments, firms use the accumulated cash 
holdings and, if needed, issue debt.  
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The determinants of cash-holdings that result from this theory are: 
a) Leverage – according to the pecking order model, debt grows when investment exceeds 
retained earnings and falls when investment is less than retained earnings. Consequently, 
cash holdings fall when investment exceeds retained earnings and grow when investment 
is less than retain earnings. This relationship between cash, debt and investment suggest 
that there is a negative relation between leverage and cash holdings. 
b)  Size – larger firms are presumably more successful, and therefore should have more 
cash, after controlling for investment (Opler et al.1999). Consequently, larger firms are 
expected to hold more cash.  
c) Cash flow – according to this theory, firms prefer to fund themselves with resources 
generated internally before resorting to the market. In these circumstances, firms with 
large cash flows will keep higher cash levels, as is confirmed by Opler et al. (1999) and 
Ozkan and Ozkan (2004), for the US and British markets respectively, or by Ferreira and 
Vilela (2004) for European Union countries.  
Although the Trade-off Model and the Pecking Order Model are generally presented as 
conflicting theories, the distinction between the two is not as clear-cut. Indeed, the expected sign 
of the relationship between cash holdings and their determinants is sometimes ambiguous or is 
the same in both frameworks (Opler et al., 1999). In order to detect the real behaviour of firms 
concerning their cash holdings, one should distinguish between short run and long run 
determinants. While pursuing a cash holding target in the long run, firms use cash holdings to 
absorb shocks in the short run. In the short run therefore, the cash holdings are also dependent 
on cash inflows and outflows, which is consistent with the pecking order behaviour. 
The Free Cash Flow Theory (Jensen, 1986) explains that managers have an incentive to 
hoard cash to increase the amount of assets under their control and to gain discretionary power 
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over the firm investment decision. With the cash holding, they do not need to raise external 
funds and could undertake investments that have a negative impact on shareholders wealth. 
First, management may hold excess cash simply because it is risk averse. More 
entrenched management would therefore be more likely to hold excess cash because it can avoid 
market discipline. Hence, one would expect firms with anti-takeover amendments to be more 
likely to hold excess cash.  
Second, management may accumulate cash to have more flexibility to pursue its own 
objectives. Cash allows management to make investments that the capital markets would not be 
willing to finance. In this sense, cash is not negative debt for management. While management 
can spend the cash whenever it wants to, it may not be able to raise debt whenever it wants to. 
By enabling management to avoid the discipline of capital markets, investing in cash can 
therefore have an adverse effect on firm value. To put it another way, increasing a firm's 
holdings of liquid assets by one euro may increase firm value by less than one euro. The 
possibility that management could be using cash for its own objectives raises the costs of 
outside funds, because outsiders do not know whether management is raising cash to increase 
firm value or to pursue its own objectives.  
Third, management may accumulate cash because it does not want to make payouts to 
shareholders, and wants to keep funds within the firm. Having the cash, however, management 
must find ways to spend it, and hence chooses poor projects when good projects are not 
available (Opler, 1999). 
In the light of this concept, if we were to apply this theory in studying the determinants 
of cash-holding of SME, we should focus on the following aspects: 
a) Leverage - low leverage firms are less subject to monitoring, allowing for superior 
managerial discretion. Therefore, it is expected that less levered firms hold more cash. 
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b) Size – larger firms tend to have larger shareholder dispersion, which gives rise to 
superior managerial discretion. Moreover, larger companies are not likely to be the target 
of a takeover due to the amount of financial resources needed by the bidder. Thus, it is 
expected that managers of larger firms have more discretionary power over the firm 
investment and financial policies, leading to a greater amount of cash holdings. 
c) Growth Opportunities – as Myers and Majluf (1984) point out, firms whose value is 
largely determined by their growth opportunities have larger information asymmetry. 
Consequently, firms with greater growth opportunities incur higher external financing 
cost. They also face higher agency cost because firms with risky debt and greater growth 
opportunities are likely to pass up valuable investment opportunities in more states of 
natures (Myers, 1977). Hence it is expected that firms with more investment 
opportunities to keep higher liquidity levels, as various empirical studies have shown 
(Kim et al. 1998, Opler et al. 1999, Ferreira and Vilela, 2004, Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004). 
As it turns out, the way the firms characteristics influence cash holdings is not a 
consensual matter among these models. Table 1 summarizes the main explanatory factors of 
firms’ levels of cash holdings, according to the three above mentioned theories.  
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2.2. Empirical Evidence 
 
Existing literature has mainly focused on evaluating the cash balances across different 
firm sizes and industries of developed countries in order to establish a relationship between asset 
management practices and firm performance.  
For example, Kim, Mauer and Sherman (1998) analyse the determinants of cash 
holdings for a sample of US companies. They report that firms facing higher costs of external 
financing, having more volatile earnings, and those firms with relatively lower returns on assets 
hold significantly larger liquid assets. 
Opler et al. (1999) examine the determinants and implications of holding cash and cash 
equivalents by 1048 publicly traded US firms in the period 1971-1994. Their results show that 
cash holdings are negatively related to size, net working capital, leverage, dividend payment, 
and government regulation while they are positively related to the cash flow-to-assets ratio, the 
capital expenditures-to-assets ratio, industry volatility, and the R&D-to-sales ratio. They 
conclude that firms with better growth opportunities and riskier cash flows had higher levels of 
cash, while large firms having better access to capital markets hold less cash. Similar results are 
reported by Faulkender (2002) for a sample of small US firms, Ozkan and Ozkan (2002) for a 
sample of UK firms and Teruel and Solano (2008) for a sample of small and medium-sized 
Spanish firms. 
Considering the agency costs that arise due to excessive cash levels, Harford (1999) 
empirically studies the notion that excessive cash leads the managers to make value decreasing 
investment decisions. He estimates a sample of all acquisition attempts by US firms during the 
period 1977-1993. The results support the hypothesis that acquisition by cash rich firms are 
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value decreasing. Moreover, they are more likely to make diverse acquisitions, and their targets 
firms are less attractive to other bidders. The similar phenomenon is observed in bidder firms in 
a merger depicted by sharp decline in operating performance. 
Pinkowitz and Williamson (2001) examine the effect of bank power on cash holding 
patterns of industrial firms for a sample of Japanese firms for the period 1974-1995, German 
firms for the period 1984-1994 and US firms for 1971-1994. The cross country analysis show 
that Japanese firms tend to hold more cash than their American or German counterparts do. 
While cash holding pattern was similar across German and US firms, the OLS regression 
analysis reveal that Japanese cash balances are significantly influenced by the monopoly power 
of the banks. This is consistent with the fact that high cash holdings mean higher rents extracted 
by the banks during the periods when they enjoy certain power in the corporate lending system. 
Dittmar et al. (2003) test the significance of corporate governance in determining the 
corporate cash holdings. They collect the data of more than 11,000 firms from 45 countries for 
the year 1998 and employed a shareholders’ rights index developed by La Porta et al. (1998). 
The results reveal that the firms in countries with low shareholder protection hold up to twice as 
much cash as firms in countries with high shareholder protection. In case of poor shareholder 
protection, the factors determining corporate cash holding, such as investment opportunities and 
asymmetric information become less important. Furthermore, they find that with the easier 
access to funds, firms hold larger cash which supports the agency theory. 
Ferreira and Vilela (2004) investigate the determinants of corporate cash holdings using 
a sample of 400 firms in 12 EMU countries including Germany, Austria, France, Greece, Italy, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Belgium, Ireland, Finland and Luxemburg for the period 1987-
2000. The results show that cash holdings are positively influenced by investment opportunity 
set and firm cash flows, while assets’ liquidity, leverage, firm size and bank debt negatively 
 14 
affect the cash holdings. Low levels of cash are held by firms in countries with superior investor 
protection and concentrated ownership. 
Guney et al (2006) examine the impact of leverage on cash balances of firms, which they 
argue may be non-monotonic. A negative (substitution effect) relation between leverage and 
cash holdings exists to the extent that leverage of firms acts as a proxy for their ability to issue 
debt. However, with the increase in leverage, firms may accumulate larger cash reserves so that 
the risk of financial distress and costly bankruptcy can be minimized. Therefore, at high levels 
of leverage, a positive (precautionary effect) relationship between cash holdings and leverage 
exists. Their results suggest a significant non-linear relationship between cash holding and 
leverage. Furthermore, country specific characteristics such as degree of creditor protection, 
shareholder protection and ownership concentration can influence the strength of the impact of 
leverage on cash holdings. 
Drobetz and Grüninger (2006) investigate the determinants of Swiss non-financial firms’ 
cash holdings over the 1995 to 2004 period. Their results show that the median Swiss firm holds 
almost twice as much cash and cash equivalents as the median UK or US firm. Moreover, they 
find a negative relationship between asset tangibility and cash holdings and a non-linear 
relationship between leverage and cash holdings. Dividend payments are positively related to 
cash reserves. However, they can’t prove a significantly positive relationship between growth 
opportunities and cash holdings. 
Hofmann (2006) examines the determinants of corporate cash holdings of nonfinancial 
firms in New Zealand. His findings suggest that the main determinants of corporate cash 
holdings in New Zealand are firms’ growth opportunities, the variability of its cash flows, 
leverage, dividend payments, and the availability of liquid asset substitutes. While growth 
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opportunities and the variability of cash flows are positively related to cash holdings, large 
dividend payments and liquid asset substitutes indicate lower cash holdings. 
More recently, Lins et al.(2010) analyse the structure of corporate liquidity and the 
motives that drive the companies from around the world to use cash or line of credits for their 
corporate liquidity. They find out that the firms have high level of credit lines and that also find 
that less than half of the total cash held by companies is held for non-operational purposes, 
amounting to only about 2% of assets. They conclude that non-operational cash is held to guard 
against future cash flow shocks in bad times, while credit lines are held to give firms the option 
to exploit future business opportunities available in good times. 
The empirical researches reveal that that the firm specific factors affecting the corporate 
cash holdings have differing relationship across different countries and firm sizes. Moreover, the 
behaviour of these variables has been changing over time. In the summarizing table (Table 2) 
we can see that the results of these empirical studies described above are diverging, supporting 
all of the three theories: the Trade-off Model, the Pecking Order and the Free Cash Flow 
Theory. 
Based on the past findings, the current research tries to analyse the behaviour of firm 
specific factors with respect to SMEs cash holdings in Portugal. 
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3. Research Design 
 
For this research, it will be selected a sample of manufacturing companies2 that during 
the period of analysis (2001-2007) complied with the SME condition, according to the 
requirements established by the European Commission recommendation 96/280/CE of 3 April, 
1996, on the definition of small and medium-sized firms. Specifically, the sample firms met the 
following conditions:  
- had less than 250 employees; 
- turned over less than €50 million; 
- possessed less than €43 million worth of total assets. 
The information required for the sample was obtained from SABI (System of Analysis 
of Iberian Balance Sheet), developed by Bureau Van Dijk. This database includes accounting 
and financial information on Spanish and Portuguese firms, obtained from the annual financial 
statements deposited at the Registry of Companies of these two countries. For this study, we 
will be using only the data regarding the Portuguese companies, refined in order to eliminate 
cases with errors in the accounting data or lost values for some of the variables from the sample. 
Specifically, the variables such as assets, fixed assets, working capital and short-term and long-
term debt were required to be positive. Also, the companies that didn’t present information for 
all the required elements were eliminated from the sample. Our sample includes survivors and 
non-survivors that appeared on SABI at any time during the sample period. After applying the 
                                                 
2
 Companies with CAE – Classificação Portuguesa das Actividades Económicas (Rev 2.1.) codes from 15000 to 
37200 
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corresponding filters, we end up with a panel of 10.870 observations, corresponding to 1.553 
Portuguese SMEs3.  
The dependent variable cash holdings (CASH) used in this study will be measured 
similarly to the one used by Ozkan and Ozkan (2004), and it will be calculated as the ratio of 
cash and marketable securities to net total assets. 
As for the independent variables, the model will use eight explanatory factors of cash 
holdings, similar to the ones used by Teruel and Solano (2008), which, according to the three 
theories mentioned above (the Trade-off Model, Pecking Order Theory and Free Cash Flow 
Theory) are the most relevant when determining the cash holdings: 
• Growth Opportunities (GROWOP) – the proxy used is the ratio salest/salest-1 used by 
Scherr e Hulburt (2001), assuming that the firms that grew most in the past are expected 
to have more growth opportunities in the future. According to the Free Cash Flow 
Theory, the relation with the dependent variable is expected to be a positive one. 
• Size (SIZE) – calculated as the natural logarithm of sales, as used by Teruel and Solano 
(2008). According to the Trade-Off Model, it is expected a negative relation between 
this variable and the level of cash holdings. On the other hand, using the hypothesis of 
the Pecking Order Theory and the Free Cash Flow Theory, the relationship could be a 
positive one. 
• Relationships with Financial Institutions (BANKR) – the proxy used to express this 
variable are the bank debt/total debt ratio (Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004) which, in the Trade-
off Model’s perspective is expected to have a negative relation with the dependent 
variable. 
                                                 
3
  1.483 SMEs in 2001, 1.582 in 2002, 1.611 in 2003, 1.601 in 2004, 1.351 in 2005, 1.382 in 2006 and 1.860 in 
2007 
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• Financial Distress (FDISTRESS) – is calculated according to the re-estimation of 
Altman’s model carried out by Begley, Mings and Watts (1996), given by the following 
expression: 
 
ZSCORE = 0,104 * X1 + 0,010 * X2 + 0,106 * X3 + 0,003 * X4 + 0,169 * X5 
where:  X1 = working capital/total assets 
  X2 = retained earnings/total assets 
  X3 = net operating profits/total assets 
  X4 = book value of capital/book value of debt 
 X5 = sales/total assets   
 
In the original model, the ratio X4 is calculated as market value of capital divided 
by the book value of debt, but because in the case of SMEs the market value is not 
available, here it was used the alternative proposed by Scherr and Hulburt (2001), which 
is the book value of the assets. A higher ZSCORE implies a lower default risk
 
However, 
the relation between this variable and the cash holding is still to be defined, as the 
previous researches have shown both positive and negative correlation.  
• Leverage (LEV) – is measured by the ratio of total debt to shareholders’ equity (Teruel 
and Solano, 2008). In the framework of the three theories, the relationship between this 
variable and cash holdings could be positive or negative. 
• Debt Maturity Structure (DEBTSTR) – the long-term debt/total debt ratio is used to 
proxy this variable (Opler et al. 1999), and the correlation between this variable and the 
cash holdings is expected to be negative. 
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• Cash-Flows (CFLOW) – the (pre-tax profits + depreciation)/total assets ratio will 
express this variable (Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004). According to the Pecking Order Theory, 
it is expected that firms with larger cash flows to hold more cash. On the other hand, in 
the framework of the Trade-off Model, a negative relation between cash flow and cash 
holdings is expected. 
• Liquidity (LIQ) – in line with the previous work of Opler et al. (1999), Ferreira and 
Viela (2004) and Ozkan and Ozkan (2004), the existence of other liquid assets that may 
substitute cash will be measured by calculating the ratio of (working capital-cash)/total 
assets; a negative relationship is expected. 
A briefly description of these variables is made in the Table 3. In order to characterize 
the companies from the sample, in Table 4 it is illustrated the descriptive statistics of the 
variables used. 
We can see that the sample is made up of highly leveraged SMEs, with an average debt 
of 2,529 times their shareholders’ equity. Bank debt represents, on average, 32.9% of these 
firms’ total debt. In addition, most of their debt is short-term, with their long-term debt making 
up only 28,70% of their external financing. The average cash-holdings of Portuguese SMEs is 
4,77% of total assets. These results are consistent with the findings of Teruel and Solano (2008) 
for the Spanish SMEs, although their results indicate that the Spanish SMEs prefer to hold on 
average less cash than the Portuguese ones (3,8%) and rely more on short-term debt (86,48% 
short-term debt in total debt). 
Table 5 shows the correlation coefficients of the variables. In general, the correlation 
between the companies’ cash holdings and the explanatory variables have the expected sign, 
except for the variable measuring the growth opportunities (GROWOP), although the proxy for 
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leverage (LEV) in not statistically significant and its correlation with the cash holdings its 
insignificant. Moreover, the correlation between the explanatory variables it’s also not very 
high. 
After determining these values for each company from the sample, we first conducted an 
univariate analysis, in order to determine if there were significant differences for the variables 
studied between the firms in relation to their levels of cash holdings. Then we studied the 
determinants of cash holdings using a linear regression of cash holdings on the exogenous 
variables described above. The model is given by the following equation: 
 
CASHi =  α+ β1GROWOPi + β2BANKRi + β3SIZEi + β4FDISTRESSi + β5LEVi + β6DEBTSTRi 
+ β7CFLOWi + β8LIQi + εt              (1) 
 
where i represents the firm, α is a constant, βi (i=1,..,8) are the coefficients of the regression, ε 
represents the error, CASH is the ratio of cash plus marketable securities to total assets, 
GROWOP measures growth opportunities, SIZE expresses the size of the firm, BANKR 
measures the level of short-term bank debt, FDISTRESS the probability of financial distress, 
LEV the leverage, DEBTSTR expresses the debt maturity structure, CFLOW the capacity to 
generate cash flow and LIQ the investment in other liquid assets. 
For testing the hypothesis concerning the determinants factors of firms’ cash holdings, 
we pool the data for all companies at each year and estimate by OLS equation (1). Similar 
methodologies were also used in previous studies on cash-holdings. For example Teruel and 
Solano (2008) use a panel data methodology for their study of Spanish SMEs and Ferreira and 
Vilela (2004) use this methodology, but they also run a Fama and MacBeth regression and a 
cross-sectional regression, like Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) also do. 
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Pooled regressions are useful in that they allow us to test assumptions that are implicit in 
cross-sectional analyses. Using this, it is possible to control for unobservable heterogeneity, 
since the methodology provides us with more than one cross-section, which allows us to 
eliminate biases deriving from the existence of individual effects.  
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4. Empirical results 
 
 
4.1. Univariate tests 
 
Table 6 shows the mean values of the variables used in this study, for each quartile of the 
variable CASH. The quartiles have been constructed annually, following the methodology used 
by Opler et al. (1999), which explains why the ranges of the variable CASH overlap across 
quartiles. A difference of means test based on Student-t was carried out in order to determine if 
the mean values of the fourth quartile are significantly different from those of the first. The t-
statistic is shown in the final column in Table 6. 
In general, the characteristics of the firms holding more cash (fourth quartile) are 
significantly different from those with lower levels of cash holdings (first quartile), with the 
exception of growth opportunities and leverage. Therefore, we can observe that smaller firms 
with less liquidity and higher cash flows and more likelihood of insolvency tend to hold more 
cash, while bigger firms with more long-term debt and higher proportion of bank debt present 
lower levels of cash holdings, as predicted by the Trade-Off and Pecking Order theories. On the 
other hand, the relationship between firms’ growth opportunities and their cash holdings is 
inconsistent with the Free Cash Flow Theory. However, some firm’s characteristics do not 
change monotonically across cash-to-assets ratio quartile, as can be seen, for example, for the 
variable LEV. This indicates that comparing the first and fourth quartiles is not sufficient to 
describe the relation between cash holdings and firm’s characteristics.    
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4.2. Regression tests 
 
A pooled time series regression has been estimated to evaluate the factors influencing 
corporate cash holdings. The estimated results are reported in Table 7. As we can see from the 
values of the variance inflation factor (VIF <10) 4, the multicollinearity of the regression is low, 
meaning, on average, the standard error for the coefficient of each independent variable is 1,04 
times as large as it would be if that independent variable were uncorrelated with the other 
independent variables from the regression. 
Contrary to our expectation, the results of our regression suggest that the firms with 
better growth opportunities have smaller cash holdings. The negative coefficient for the 
GROWOP variable is inconsistent with the previous findings of Kim et al. (1998), Opler et al. 
(1999) and Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) for large firms in the United States and UK markets. The 
little statistical significance of this variable indicates that in the case of SMEs the level of cash 
holdings may not be influenced by their investment opportunities. 
The negative coefficient of firm’s size variable supports the Trade-off Theory, according 
to which larger firms should hold lower levels of cash due to the economies of scale associated 
with maintaining the cash level required for the normal transactions of the firm, but also because 
larger firms suffer less information asymmetry. On the other hand, these results contradict the 
Pecking Order and the Free Cash Flow theories, as reported by the earlier studies of Pinkowitz 
and Williamson (2001) and Ferreira and Vilela (2004). 
The coefficient of the variable BANKR is negative which indicates that maintaining a 
banking relationship improves access to this type of external financing by reducing the 
                                                 
4
 Kutner, Nachtsheim, Neter, Applied Linear Regression Models, 4th edition, McGraw-Hill 
Irwin, 2004. 
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information asymmetry between borrower and lender. This supports the Trade-off Theory and, 
as empirically confirmed by Pinkowitz and Williamson (2001) and Dittmar (2003), shows that 
firms that are more highly indebted to credit institutions can reduce their investments in liquid 
financial assets. 
As shown in previous empirical evidence for large firms (Kim et al. 1998, Opler et al. 
1999, Ozkan and Ozkan 2004, among others), the sign of the leverage (LEV) variable is 
negative which means that the most highly leveraged SMEs have less cash holdings, which is 
also consistent with Pecking Order and Free Cash Flow theories. According to the Pecking 
Order Theory high levels of debt and little cash holdings occur simultaneously when firms’ 
investment exceeds retained earnings. The argument that high-leveraged firms have less cash 
holdings is also supported by the Free Cash Flow Theory, but the main reason is because high 
leveraged firms are more subject to monitoring, preventing managerial discretion. The Trade-
Off Model is not clear about the predicted sign for this relationship, but the argument that firms 
with higher leverage need more cash holdings to prevent bankruptcy, as Ozkan and Ozkan 
(2004) also refer in their study, is not supported by this proxy. On the other hand, this 
explanation is consistent with our results on the financial distress variable, as the coefficient for 
FDISTRESS is positive and significant. 
The relationship between the debt maturity structure of the SMEs and their level of cash 
holdings is consistent with the empirical findings of Ferreira and Vilela (2004) and  the 
hypothesis of the Trade-off Theory, according to which the firms with a shorter debt maturity  
structure would keep higher cash levels in order to reduce the risk deriving from the non-
renewal of their short-term debt and to reduce the costs associated with dependence on external 
financing, given the higher information asymmetry of SMEs with more short-term debt. 
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On the other hand, the sign of the cash flow to assets coefficient is positive, which 
contradicts the Trade-off Theory but supports the Pecking Order Theory. The effect of cash flow 
on cash holdings confirms the empirical results of Opler et al. (1999), Ferreira and Vilela (2004) 
and Teruel and Solano (2008) and supports the idea that in the presence of information 
asymmetries firms prefer to finance themselves from internally generated resources. This is 
even more relevant for our study, as the information asymmetry and agency conflicts associated 
with debt are greater for smaller firms. 
Finally, the negative coefficient of liquidity (LIQ) variable supports the hypothesis that 
firms with more liquid assets will tend to reduce their cash levels, since these assets can be used 
as cash substitutes. This result is consistent with the arguments of the Trade-off Theory and with 
the precious findings of Drobetz and Grüninger (2006) and Hofmann (2006) 
Using this model of linear regression, the equation of a SME’s cash holdings can be 
written as follows: 
CASHi = 0,128 - 0,00003*GROWOPi - 0,011* SIZEi - 0,013* BANKRi + 0,131*FDISTRESSi - 
0,000002*LEVi - 0,008*DEBTSTRi + 0,002*CFLOWi - 0,084*LIQi + εt 
 
Where the CASH variable is the ratio of cash plus marketable securities to total assets, 
GROWOP measures growth opportunities, SIZE expresses the size of the firm, BANKR 
measures the level of short-term bank debt, FDISTRESS stands for the probability of financial 
distress, LEV is the firm’s leverage, DEBTSTR expresses the debt maturity structure, CFLOW 
the capacity to generate cash flow, LIQ the investment in other liquid assets and ε represents the 
error. 
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4.3. Robustness and additional tests 
 
In order to evaluate the robustness of the regression results, we re-estimate equation (1) 
using alternative proxies for the independent variables, SIZE, FDISTRESS, and CFLOW, and 
including a yearly dummy for controlling unobserved macroeconomic effects.  
To measure the firms’ size we used two proxies, SIZE1 and SIZE2. On the one hand, 
SIZE1, this, as we seen before, is calculated as the natural logarithm of sales, and on the other 
hand SIZE2, the natural logarithm of assets.  
The likelihood of financial distress is also calculated using two proxies: FDISTRESS1, 
which was calculated above according to the re-estimation of Altman’s model (ZSCORE), and 
FDISTRESS2, expressed by the research and development expenditures (R&D) standardized by 
year-end sales (Opler et al, 1999). Opler and Titman (1994) argue that R&D expenses are 
correlated with bankruptcy and distress costs, as R&D expenditures can proxy for the degree of 
product specialization and it is expected customers to be more reluctant to purchase products 
from a distressed firm with very specialized products that may require future servicing. Finally, 
the cash flow has been approximated by using the two proxies CFLOW1 (the pre-tax profits plus 
depreciation divided by sales) and CFLOW2 (the pre-tax profits plus depreciation divided by 
total assets). 
Table 8 presents the results. In specification 1 we add to the base regression the yearly 
dummies. In specification 2 we use the alternative proxy for size. In specification 3, we use the 
alternative proxy for financial distress and in specification 4 we use the alternative proxy for 
cash flow.  
The results obtained with all these estimations are generally consistent with the previous 
findings. The model constructed with the alternative SIZE proxy is almost identical with the 
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original regression found. On the other hand, when we chose a different measure for the 
likelihood of the financial distress, the regression obtained turn out to be less significant, and the 
coefficient of the FDISTRESS proxy changes it sign, becoming negative and confirming Ozkan 
and Ozkan’s (2004) previous study. Nevertheless, it should be mentioned that this proxy is 
calculated as the ratio of R&D investment to total assets and as this study focuses on SMEs, the 
information regarding R&D investment was not available for all the firms from our sample 
(from the original 10.870 observations only 3.039 were valid for this proxy). Finally, the 
CFLOW2 proxy proves to have less significance in the regression than the CFLOW1 proxy used 
initially.  
The results of the regression with the dummy variable are no different from the dummy-
free regression, which means that either there are no macro economical factors that influenced 
the SMEs’ decisions on cash holding in the period analysed, either a different variable, like 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) should be used in order to measure the possible effects of the 
evolution of the economic cycle on cash levels. 
Therefore, in Figure 3 we present the evolution over time of the cash holdings of the 
firms analysed, along with the evolution of the Portuguese’s economy GDP growth in the period 
of time analysed5. We can see that the ratio of cash holdings to total assets (CASH) remains 
above 4% throughout the period, reaching its highest level in 2007. With regard to the GDP 
growth, we do not observe a clear direct relation between its evolution and that of the cash held 
by SMEs 
In order to further study the effects of the macro economical environment changes over 
time on cash holdings. In specification 1 of Table 9 there are presented the results of the linear 
                                                 
5
 GDP data from the National Bank of Portugal 
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regression with the GDP growth variable included. This confirms our expectations, that GDP 
growth does not explain the level of cash holdings of Portuguese SMEs. 
Additionally, in order to test the robustness of our model, we testes the original 
hypothesis on two different samples. First, we limited our sample to profitable Portuguese 
SMEs. By introducing the limitation of positive EBIT (Earnings before Interest and Taxes) we 
end up with 8.771 observations for the period 2001-2007, which correspond to 1.253 firms. Our 
second sample was made by selecting only the survival firms, that is, the firms that presented 
activity during all the studied period. This second sample is made up of 5.600 observations, 
corresponding to 800 SMEs. 
The results of the linear regression for these two samples are presented in specification 2 
and 3, respectively, of Table 9. Once again, this confirms our initial conclusions, that the small 
and medium-sized-firms with better growth opportunities, better relation with banks, with 
higher level of leverage and liquid assets hold less cash, while the SMEs that are more likely to 
enter in financial distress and have a shorter debt maturity structure tend to have a higher level 
of cash holdings. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
The aim of this paper was to analyse the determinants of cash holdings in small and 
medium-sized Portuguese companies. The study was conducted with a panel data of Portuguese 
SMEs, made up of 10.870 observations corresponding to 1.553 firms during the period 2001-
2007. 
The descriptive statistics shows that the Portuguese SMEs hold an average of 4.77% of 
their assets in form of cash for investment and financing purposes. 
Using a pooled regression, this study models the cash-to-asset ratio as a function of firm 
specific factors including: growth opportunities, firm size, relationship with financial 
institutions, financial distress, leverage, debt maturity structure, cash flow and liquid assets 
substitutes. The behaviour of these variables was analysed under the framework of the main 
three theories of corporate cash holding: Trade-off Model, Pecking Order Theory and Free Cash 
Flow Theory. 
The regression results indicate that all the variables in the model are significant in 
defining the cash levels of Portuguese small and medium-sized enterprises. Consistent with the 
empirical research, the amount of cash held by Portuguese SMEs is positively affected by their 
capacity to generate cash flow and the likelihood of a financial distress and negatively affected 
by the investment opportunities, the relationship with the banks, the leverage level, the amount 
of liquid assets substitutes, the debt maturity structure and the size of the firms. Moreover, the 
results obtained for profitable SMEs and for those that remained in our sample during the whole 
analysed period are also consistent with our hypothesis and with previous empirical research in 
this field. 
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Specifically, these findings are consistent with the Trade-off Theory that argues that 
firms identify their optimal level of cash holdings by weighting the marginal costs and marginal 
benefits of holding cash. 
Regarding the effects of market imperfections on cash holdings, the results indicate that 
the SMEs with more information asymmetry hold more liquid assets, which confirms the 
hypothesis of the Pecking Order Theory. This supports the idea that relationship with credit 
institutions can reduce agency costs and information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders, 
cutting a firm’s cost of external financing. Also, firms with a greater capacity to generate cash 
flow have higher levels of cash holdings. 
The Free Cash Flow Theory could also be supported by the relationship between the 
leverage level and the cash holdings of Portuguese SMEs. However, all the other determinants 
considered seem to contradict this theory. Overall, we can conclude that the Trade-off Theory 
and the Pecking Order Theory are the ones that play the most important role in explaining the 
determinants of Portuguese SMEs’ cash holdings.  
Nevertheless, it is important to mention that the results obtained are limited by the 
methodology used, specifically the univariate test and multivariate pooled regressions. Previous 
empirical studies have also used cross-section regressions, Fama and MacBeth methodologies, 
GMM (Generalized Method of Moments) estimations and even qualitative methods like 
questionnaires for the sampled firms. Moreover, this study could be further developed by 
analyzing the determinants of cash flow for SMEs from specific industries or with different 
ownership structures, hence adding new variables that could explain the management cash level 
decisions. 
On the other hand, the study of the macro economical environment changes didn’t bring 
significant results and doesn’t allow us to conclude if firm’s external factors played a part in 
 31 
SMEs decisions on cash holdings for the period considered. Given the present economical 
global situation, a future study that includes macro economical determinants of SMEs cash 
holdings, like interest rates and country regulation, should be interesting and would bring new 
valuable information on this area. The future researches should also explore the impact of 
corporate cash holdings on firms’ profitability and performance. 
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Appendix  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 - Optimal level of cash holdings in the Trade-Off Model 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 shows the marginal cost curve of being short of liquid assets and the marginal cost curve of holding cash. 
The marginal cost curve of being short of liquid assets is downward. sloping and the marginal cost curve of holding 
liquid assets is assumed to be horizontal - if the cost is a liquidity premium, there is little reason to assume that the 
liquidity premium changes as the liquid asset holdings increase. If the firm has a shortage of liquid assets, it can 
cope with this by either decreasing investment or dividends or by rising outside funds through security sales or 
asset sales. A greater shortage has greater costs since it involves decreasing investment more or raising more 
outside funds. For a given amount of liquid assets, an increase in the cost of being short of liquid assets or an 
increase in the probability of being short of liquid assets will both shift the marginal cost curve to the right and 
increase the firm’s holdings of liquid assets. 
 
The optimal amount of liquid assets is given by the intersection of the marginal cost of liquid assets curve and the 
marginal cost of liquid asset shortage curve. The marginal cost of liquid assets curve is non-decreasing while the 
marginal cost of liquid asset shortage curve is decreasing. 
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Figure 2 shows how the companies prioritize their sources of financing, from internal financing to equity. 
According to the Pecking Order Theory, internal funds are used first, and when that is depleted, debt is issued, and 
when it is not sensible to issue any more debt, equity is issued. 
 
C* - the amount of internal funds that the firm has available for investment; (D*- C*) - the firm's debt capacity or 
the amount of debt it can undertake without jeopardizing its financial health or future investment opportunities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 - The Pecking Order Model 
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Figure 3 – Cash holdings and GDP growth over time 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 shows the annual evolution of GDP growth and the average annual level of cash holdings. CASH is the 
ratio of cash plus marketable securities to total assets, GDP is the Gross Domestic Product growth, calculated as the 
growth rate of GDP at market prices (2006) and expresses as percentage change on previous year. 
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Table 1 – Cash holding determinants according to the three theories 
 
 
 
 
Variable 
Trade-off  
Theory 
Pecking Order  
Theory 
Free Cash Flow 
 Theory 
Growth opportunities * * Positive 
Size Negative Positive Positive 
Relationship with banks Negative * * 
Financial distress Positive/Negative * * 
Leverage Positive/Negative Negative Negative 
Debt maturity structure Negative * * 
Cash flow Negative Positive * 
Liquidity Negative * * 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 – Cash holding determinants in the previous empirical studies 
 
 
 
 
Author 
Growth 
opportunities 
Leverage 
Debt maturity 
structure 
Cash flow Liquidity Size 
Relationship  
with banks 
Financial 
distress 
Kim et al. (1998) + -  -     
Opler et al. (1999) + -  +  +   
Faulkender (2002) + -  +  +   
Ozkan&Ozkan (2002) + -  +  +  + 
Harford (1999) 
   -     
Pinkowitz &Williamson (2001) + -  -  - -  
Dittmar (2003) 
      -  
Ferreira &Vilela (2004)  + - - + - -   
Guney (2006) 
 +/-       
Drobetz &Grüninger (2006) 
 +/-   -    
Hofmann (2006) + -  + -    
Teruel & Solano (2008) + + - + - - - + 
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Table 3 - Description of Variables 
 
 
 
Name Definition 
Cash Holdings (CASH) (Cash + Marketable securities)/Total assets 
Growth Opportunities (GROWOP) Salest/Salest-1 
Size (SIZE) Ln(Sales) 
Relationships with Financial 
Institutions (BANKR) 
Bank debt/Total debt 
Financial Distress (FDISTRESS) ZSCORE = 0,104*X1+0,010*X2+0,106*X3+0,003*X4+0,169*X5 
X1 = Working capital/Total assets; X2 = Retained earnings/Total 
assets; X3 = Net operating profits/Total assets; X4 = Book value of 
capital/Book value of debt;X5 = Sales/Total assets   
Leverage (LEV) Total debt/Shareholders equity 
Debt Maturity Structure (DEBTSTR) Long-term debt/Total debt 
Cash-Flows (CFLOW) (Pre-tax profits + Depreciation)/Total assets 
Liquidity (LIQ) (Working capital - Cash)/Total assets 
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Table 4 - Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 
Variable N Median Range Mean Std. Deviation 
CASH 10.870 0.02159 
 
0.7982 0.047778 0.0714514 
GROWOP 10.870 1.02982 
 
1,209.22 1.193591 11.6563009 
SIZE 10.870 7.999846 
 
10.8011 7.853906 1.3946514 
BANKR 10.870 0.31294 
 
1.0000 0.329639 0.1997534 
FDISTRESS 10.870 0.199204 
 
1.8867 0.215134 0.1020290 
LEV 10.870 1.981044 
 
2,517.00 2.529491 73.8106595 
DEBTSTR 10.870 0.249227 
 
1.0000 0.287088 0.2162606 
CFLOW 10.870 0.549902 
 
14.5000 0.628094 0.5097253 
LIQ 10.870 0.19196 
 
0.9612 0.223620 0.1625808 
  
 
CASH is the ratio of cash plus marketable securities to total assets, GROWOP measures growth opportunities, 
SIZE expresses the size of the firm, BANKR measures the level of short-term bank debt, FDISTRESS the 
probability of financial distress, LEV the leverage, DEBTSTR expresses the debt maturity structure, CFLOW the 
capacity to generate cash flow and LIQ the investment in other liquid assets. 
 
 
  
 
Table 5 - Correlation Matrix 
 
 
 
 CASH GROWOP SIZE BANKR FDISTRESS LEV DEBTSTR CFLOW LIQ 
CASH 1         
GROWOP -0.006 1        
SIZE -0.161** 0.11 1       
BANKR -0.124** 0.005 0.171** 1      
FDISTRESS 0.142** -0.007 0.212** -0.190** 1     
LEV -0.00003 0.001 -0.009 0.002 0.018 1    
DEBTSTR -0.064** 0.008 0.060** 0.151** -0.252** -0.007 1   
CFLOW 0.039** -0.010 0.041** -0.049** 0.076** -0.001 0.097** 1  
LIQ -0.160** -0.011 -0.089** 0.068** 0.072** 0.018 -0.116** -0.096** 1 
 
 
CASH is the ratio of cash plus marketable securities to total assets, GROWOP measures growth opportunities, SIZE expresses the size of the firm, BANKR 
measures the level of short-term bank debt, FDISTRESS the probability of financial distress, LEV the leverage, DEBTSTR expresses the debt maturity structure, 
CFLOW the capacity to generate cash flow and LIQ the investment in other liquid assets. 
 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 6 – Firms’ characteristics by CASH Quartiles 
 
 
Variable First Quartile Second Quartile Third Quartile Fourth Quartile 
Range CASH 0 to 0,007 0,006 to 0,022 0.018 to 0,061 0,052 to 0,798 
t-statistic 
(p-value) 
CASH 0.0032 
(0.0030) 
0.0137 
(0.0134) 
0.0361 
(0.0347) 
0.1378 
(0.1043) 
-80.074 
(0.000) 
GROWOP 1.5134 
(1.0235) 
1.0590 
(1.0285) 
1.1124 
(1.0332) 
1.0904 
(1.0342) 
0.947 
(0.344) 
SIZE 8.0678 
(8.2189) 
8.0202 
(8.1639) 
7.8321 
(7.9484) 
7.4966 
(7.6468) 
14.706 
(0.000) 
BANKR 0.3606 
(0.3503) 
0.3578 
(0.3493) 
0.3199 
(0.3014) 
0.2804 
(0.2505) 
14.993 
(0.000) 
FDISTRESS 0.1931 
(0.1758) 
0.2043 
(0.1916) 
0.2216 
(0.2091) 
0.2414 
(0.2205) 
-16.444 
(0.000) 
LEV 3.6673 
(2.0497) 
0.3296 
(2.0280) 
3.1539 
(2.0037) 
2.9679 
(1.7995) 
0.633 
(0.527) 
DEBTSTR 0.3059 
(0.2783) 
0.3020 
(0.2718) 
0.2754 
(0.2320) 
0.2652 
(0.2109) 
6.834 
(0.000) 
CFLOW 0.6168 
(0.5301) 
0.6182 
(0.5452) 
0.6250 
(0.5568) 
0.6523 
(0.5666) 
-2.432 
(0.010) 
LIQ 0.2426 
(0.2087) 
0.2371 
(0.2044) 
0.2249 
(0.1933) 
0.1899 
(0.1571) 
11.590 
(0.000) 
 
Comparison of mean values of characteristics of 1.553 SMEs for the period 2001-2007. Quartiles for variable 
CASH created annually. Each quartile contains approximately 2.718 observations. Median values in brackets. 
CASH is the ratio of cash plus marketable securities to total assets, GROWOP measures growth opportunities, 
SIZE expresses the size of the firm, BANKR measures the level of short-term bank debt, FDISTRESS the 
probability of financial distress, LEV the leverage, DEBTSTR expresses the debt maturity structure, CFLOW the 
capacity to generate cash flow and LIQ the investment in other liquid assets, t statistic tests differences of means 
between first and fourth quartile. P-value in brackets. 
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Table 7 - Determinants of SMEs cash holdings 
 
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 B 
Std. 
Error Beta t VIF 
(Constant) 0.128 0.004   30.954   
GROWOP -0.00003 0.0001 -0.004 -0.448 1.000 
SIZE -0.011 0.000 -0.210 -21.732 1.128 
BANKR -0.013 0.003 -0.036 -3.696 1.116 
FDISTRESS 0.131 0.007 0.186 18.657 1.201 
LEV -0.000002 0.00001 -0.002 -0.213 1.001 
DEBTSTR -0.008 0.003 -0.023 -2.373 1.117 
CFLOW 0.002 0.001 0.016 1.708 1.031 
LIQ -0.084 0.004 -0.190 -20.403 1.047 
Adjusted R Square 0.097     
N 10.870     
 
 
 
CASH is the ratio of cash plus marketable securities to total assets, GROWOP measures growth opportunities, 
SIZE expresses the size of the firm, BANKR measures the level of short-term bank debt, FDISTRESS the 
probability of financial distress, LEV the leverage, DEBTSTR expresses the debt maturity structure, CFLOW the 
capacity to generate cash flow and LIQ the investment in other liquid assets. All t-statistics (t) are 
heteroskedasticity robust using the White correction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 8 – Robustness of the exogenous variables on Corporate Cash Holdings 
 
 
1 2 3 4   
  Beta t Beta t Beta t Beta t 
(Constant) 0.125 28.164 0.1407 30.6131 0.1405 33.9295 0.1289 31.3002 
GROWOP 
-0.000025 -0.441 -0.00002 -0.4463 -0.00003 -0.5577 -0.00003 -0.4702 
SIZE1 
-0.011 -21.262 - - -0.0080 -16.5360 -0.0107 -21.4780 
SIZE2 - - -0.0112 -21.8563 - - - - 
BANKR 
-0.013 -3.862 -0.0119 -3.4448 -0.0271 -7.9206 -0.0136 -3.9365 
FDISTRESS1 0.132 18.776 0.0799 11.8651 - - 0.1314 18.7893 
FDISTRESS2 - - - - -0.1207 -2.6102 - - 
LEV 
-0.000002 -0.193 -0.000003 -0.3797 0.000001 0.1449 -0.000002 -0.2164 
DEBTSTR 
-0.007 -2.307 -0.0061 -1.9237 -0.0215 -6.8322 -0.0066 -2.0779 
CFLOW1 0.001 1.074 0.0019 1.4869 0.0045 3.4558 - - 
CFLOW2 - - - - - - 0.0000 -1.4065 
LIQ -0.085 -0.744 -0.0785 -19.2724 -0.0767 -18.5010 -0.0846 -20.7001 
Year Dummy Yes No No No 
Adjusted R Square 0.097 0.098 0.068 0.097 
 
 
 
CASH is the ratio of cash plus marketable securities to total assets, GROWOP measures growth opportunities, SIZE1 and SIZE2 express the size of the firm, 
BANKR measures the level of short-term bank debt, FDISTRESS1 and FDISTRESS2 the probability of financial distress, LEV the leverage, DEBTSTR 
expresses the debt maturity structure, CFLOW1 and CFLOW2 the capacity to generate cash flow and LIQ the investment in other liquid assets. Year dummy is a 
variable that changes in time but is equal for all firms in each time period considered. All t-statistics (t) are heteroskedasticity robust using the White correction. 
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Table 9 – Determinants of corporate cash holdings for alternative samples 
 
1 2 3   
Beta t Beta t Beta t 
(Constant) 0.127 30.294 0.145 26.736 0.114 20.872 
GROWOP -0.00003 -0.448 -0.004 -1.935 -0.00002 -0.414 
SIZE -0.011 -21.695 -0.012 -19.801 -0.010 -15.318 
BANKR -0.013 -3.696 -0.015 -3.741 -0.009 -2.256 
FDISTRESS 0.130 18.642 0.123 14.836 0.094 10.339 
LEV -0.000002 -0.216 0.000 -2.099 0.000003 0.422 
DEBTSTR -0.008 -2.394 -0.008 -2.105 -0.007 -1.914 
CFLOW 0.002 1.647 0.004 2.515 0.004 2.567 
LIQ -0.084 -20.432 -0.090 -18.706 -0.058 -11.767 
GDP 0.001 1.142 - - - - 
Adjusted R Square 0.097 0.097 0.073 
N 10,870 8,771 5,600 
 
 
 
CASH is the ratio of cash plus marketable securities to total assets, GROWOP measures growth opportunities, 
SIZE expresses the size of the firm, BANKR measures the level of short-term bank debt, FDISTRESS the 
probability of financial distress, LEV the leverage, DEBTSTR expresses the debt maturity structure, CFLOW the 
capacity to generate cash flow and LIQ the investment in other liquid assets. GDP is the Gross Domestic Product 
growth, calculated as the growth rate of GDP at market prices (2006) and expresses as percentage change on 
previous year. All t-statistics (t) are heteroskedasticity robust using the White correction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
46 
